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Abstract
Computers are widely used today by most people. Internet based applications, like ecom-
merce or ebanking attracts criminals, who using sophisticated techniques, tries to introduce
malware on the victim computer. But not only computer users are in risk, also smartphones
or smartwatch users, smart cities, Internet of Things devices, etc.
Different techniques has been tested against malware. Currently, pattern matching is the
default approach in antivirus software. Also, Machine Learning is successfully being used.
Continuing this trend, in this article we propose an anomaly based method using the hard-
ware performance counters (HPC) available in almost any modern computer architecture.
Because anomaly detection is an unsupervised process, new malware and APTs can be de-
tected even if they are unknown.
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1. Introduction
Hardware Performance Counters, HPC for short, are specialized registers implemented in
modern processors. The aim of those register are to count different types of internal events
in order to conduct performance analysis, algorithm optimization or software tuning. The
available events and number of counters depends on the manufacturers. There are a lot of
events, but only a few counters (two or four counters are common). Only one event can
be assigned to a counter at once (although multiplexing techniques can be used to give the
illusion of more than one event by counter). This means that only a few type of events
can be measured while a single execution, so the events wanted have to be preselected.
As an example, some events that can be measured are: data cache missed, instruction
cache missed, branch prediction faults, instruction executed, cycles, etc. The observation
of the counters can be useful for detecting some non-desirable states of a running software,
like a malware attack. Malware usually uses a vulnerability in a program to modify the
execution. Two of the most used techniques are Buffer Overflow (Cowan et al., 2000)
and ROP (Prandini and Ramilli, 2012). The buffer overflow techniques tries to bypass
the limits of a memory buffer to illegally write in other zones of the program. The ROP
(Return Oriented Programing) are used when the stack is not permitted to execute code,
then little portions of code finished with the ret instruction, also called gadgets, are used to
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build the shellcode from actual and yet existent program code. Both techniques modifies
the natural flow of a program and leaves a footprint in the HPC measures. It’s possible,
using Machine Learning Techniques to detect those anomalous behavior in the program
execution. Two possible approaches can be used in Machine Learning: Supervised and
unsupervised Learning. In Supervised Learning, a Classifier is trained with positive and
negative data (i.e. non-malware programs and malware programs). Although a trained
classifier is able to generalize, the classifier could have problems with unknown malware
(like APTs). This approach is not very different from current antivirus software that needs
to know the malware before be able to detect it. In addition to the supervised learning, there
exist Unsupervised Learning techniques in Machine Learning. In Unsupervised Learning
it’s not necessary to train the classifier since another strategy is taken. Instead of providing
positive and negative examples, one, two or more features in the data are used to create
groups with similar characteristics. This technique is named Clustering and let discover
different classes of elements in a dataset. Also, there is other subfield in Machine Learning
named Anomaly Detection (Chandola et al., 2009) whose techniques are able to find outliers
in datasets. This is, data that are different from the rest because they deviate from the norm.
Anomaly Detection is specially interesting because don’t need previous training and could
be able to find ”strange” situations like those in which a malware exploit a vulnerability
(e.g. while overflowing a buffer).
2. State of the art
Identifying malware attacks is a challenging problem. Different approaches have been used
to address this task, but one of the most promising are those based on Machine Learning.
One of the most used approach is detecting and analyzing automated activity based on the
malware behavior. Rieck et al. (2011) uses a sandbox to analyze the malware execution
based on the system calls, generating a pattern expressed in q-grams and using a high-
dimensional space to apply clustering methods. Similar approach has been taken by Eskin
et al. (2002) using a a multidimensional space of features and applying different algorithms
(cluster-based estimation, K-nearest neighbor and One Class SVM) to successfully detect
outliers in the feature space. A comparison of Classification and Anomaly Detection to
detect attacks has been done by Wressnegger et al. (2013). The experiments were done with
web attacks, but they show that Anomaly Detection is a suitable approach. When using
Classification or Anomaly Detection, the features taken into account are very important.
Recently, some research groups has been working with performance signatures. Avritzer
et al. (2010) has analyzed the use of basic performance signatures like memory consumption,
CPU usage or number of TCP connections to detect various types of attacks including buffer
and stack overflow, SQL injection, DoS and MITM attacks. Other researchers have studied
the problem of selecting the most appropriate features in attack detection, like Singh and
Silakari (2009) that using the DARPA KDD CUP 99 dataset of network intrusions data
taken by an IDS (Tavallaee et al., 2009) applied an ensemble approach based in information
gain (from Shannon information theory). From an initial void subset of features, iteratively,
the algorithm select those with more information gain and add it to the subset of features.
Based on the same dataset that the previous researchers, in Ghali (2009) they prosed a
new hybrid algorithm RSNNA (Rough Set Neural Network algorithm). The algorithm uses
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Rough Set theory in order to filter out superfluous and redundant information and a trained
an artificial neural network to identify any kind of new treats. With the recent addition of
HPC to the modern processors there are new performance signatures available that can be
used to detect malware. HPC are know to be accurate enough (Zaparanuks et al., 2009) and
widely available and accesible with multiplatform libraries like PAPI (Mucci et al., 1999)
or using standard tools like perf (Gregg, 2015c). Demme et al. (2013) is probably one of
the first attempts to use HPC for malware detection. They show that it’s feasible to detect
attacks measuring the HPC and using a classifier. They used different Machine Learning
algorithms: Decision Tree, KNN, Random Forest and FANN. Decision Trees seems to be
the most accurate algorithm detecting malware, still having a 10 percent of false positives.
Recently, Tang et al. (2014) used HPC but with an Anomaly Detection approach instead
of Classification methods. Surprisingly, they suggest that any event anomalies manifested
by malware code execution are not directly detectable, due to two key observations.
(1) Most of the measurement distributions are very positively skewed, with many values
clustered near zero.
(2) Deviations, if any, from the baseline event characteristics due to the exploit code are
not easily discerned.
To address the problem they rely on rank-preserving power transform on the measurements
to positively scale the values and successfully increase the detection percentage. Despite
the results, there is still room to try new approaches using Anomaly Detection techniques
and HPC that may show more promising and direct results.
3. Research questions and objectives
In the previous section, some detection methods have been presented that are being used
in the problem of identifying malware attacks using Machine Learning techniques. We have
reviewed both, Classification and Anomaly Detection methods. However, it’s clear that a
malware attack should be detected in an early stage (i.e. while exploiting a vulnerability) in
order to mitigate it’s undesirable effects. Anomaly Detection algorithms seems to be more
sensible to unknown attacks and also, they don’t need a previous training. The question
that this research tries to answer is if is it possible to use Anomaly Detection directly,
without using any other statistical construction like the rank-preserving power transform
used in Tang et al. (2014). In short, the objective of this research is to find a new method for
detecting malware attacks directly based on Anomaly Detection techniques over captured
HPC execution measures in a running program.
4. Research methodology
For the research process, using positivism as a philosophical paradigm, two methodologies
are going to be used: Experiments and Design and Creation. Experiments are used to find
which techniques may be applied in this scenario and which of them best fit for this partic-
ular problem. This new knowledge will be used to establish a new method for the malware
detection problem. Experiments will also be used to find which events in HPC contribute
with more information for the Anomaly Detection algorithm. Design and Creation will be
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used as research methodology to establish the new method (model and algorithm) for the
malware detection problem.
5. Experiments setup
To measure HPC for a process while executing three alternatives have been evaluated:
(1) Instrument the software source code with a library like PAPI.
(2) Develop a kernel module that interrupt the process execution in a regular basis to
measure HPC.
(3) Use the Linux perf kernel utility.
Clearly, the option 3 is the easiest but there are some problems with the perf utility that
have to be solved before using it. With perf record (Gregg, 2015a) there is an option (-F)
to profile the execution with a given frequency. After some test, we are unable to use this
option successfully. An alternative is to use perf stat (Gregg, 2015b). In 2013, a patch was
added to take measures of HPC at a given interval of time with the -I option (Eranian,
2015). Since this is a valid way to take measures there is still a limitation of 100ms from
measure to mesure by the IO latency. Since we are going to use a buffer to write the results
to a file, we have recompiled the perf utility to get down this limitation to 1ms.
In order to set up a controlled environment for the experiments, we will use a simple but
real program named nweb (Griffiths, 2015), A tiny web server with modifications: the most
important is that the web server has been modified to be single threaded in order to make
it easier to measure the HPC. The web software has a function named logger() who is
vulnerable to a stack overflow attack by the sprintf() function in the next line
case LOG: (void)sprintf(logbuffer," INFO: %s:%s:%d",s1, s2,socket_fd); break;
Malware usually use those type of programming errors to exploit the software. With
nweb two types of common attacks are going to be used: Stack overflow and ROP (Return
Oriented programming). In the next subsection the exploitation phase is described.
5.1 Data acquisition
The number and type of HPC events are CPU dependent, so for this experiment we used
only a common subset shared by most CPUs. Table 1 contains the events we took into
account for this study.
cpu-cycles instructions cache-references cache-misses
branches branch-misses bus-cycles ref-cycles
L1-dcache-loads L1-dcache-stores L1-icache-loads L1-icache-load-misses
LLC-loads LLC-load-misses LLC-stores LLC-store-misses
dTLB-loads dTLB-load-misses dTLB-stores dTLB-store-misses
iTLB-loads iTLB-load-misses branch-loads branch-load-misses
Table 1: HPC Events
For every event previously listed we execute some random page requests for a while
to simulate a regular web browsing (the same requests pattern was used for every counter
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using a script in python) and finally, after the page requests, the attack was performed. The
experiments were repeated at a HPC measuring frequency of 1ms, 10ms and 100ms. Every
execution was also repeated finishing with a classic stack overflow attack, a ROP attack
and with a clean exit (without any attack). As a result, more than 400MB of text data has
been recollected and analyzed. As shown in the next example, the data generated at every
execution contains the timestamp of the event, the event measure delta (increase from last
measure) and the name of the event.
# started on Sun Apr 19 01:23:16 2015
0.001225993,1621,branch-load-misses
0.002574349,5149,branch-load-misses
0.003808515,5352,branch-load-misses
0.005025360,5807,branch-load-misses
...
6. Data analysis
Analyzing big amount of data looking for anomalies is an useful technique that can be
applied to a large set of applications, including fraud detection, health improvement, mar-
keting, biology, signal processing, etc. The goal of anomaly detection is to find one or more
outliers. In the scope of this work, an outlier is an observation that deviates so much from
other observations as to arouse suspicion that it was generated by a different mechanism
other than the regular program execution flow.
6.1 Anomaly detection approaches
Cluster analysis is the task of grouping similar set of objects in a dataset. Those similar
groups are called clusters, and are widely used in Machine Learning for unsupervised clas-
sification tasks. There are many different cluster models and many clustering algorithms
for each model. Most used approaches are connectivity based, centroid based, distribution
based and density based. Some of those clustering methods have been applied yet in Tang
et al. (2014) to the problem of detecting malware.
(1) Connectivity based (or hierarchical) clustering uses the concept of distance to group the
elements in sets of similar objects. The main idea is that nearby objects are more related
that farther objects.
(2) Centroid based clustering uses the concept of a central vector (usually fixed to a k
number of vectors). The problem to solve is to find the position of the k central vectors
which best separates the data space and optimize the data distribution. The most known
algorithm of this type is k-means clustering.
(3) Distributed based clustering tries to cluster objects belonging to the same statistical
distribution. One of the most known method is the Gaussian mixture model. This method
suffers higher trend to overfitting than the others presented here.
(4) Density based clustering uses the concept of data density to group the objects. Most
popular algorithms of this type are DBSCAN and OPTICS. There is also a local density
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approach called Local Outlier Factor (LOF). As far as we know, local density based methods
have not been tested for malware detection with HPC.
6.2 Local Outlier factor (LOF)
As suggested by Tang et al. (2014), no significant deviations are detected with classical
anomaly detection methods, but using statistical methods to amplify the small deviations,
they improved the attack detection. We used a different approach: the local outlier factor or
LOF (Breunig et al., 2000). Instead of finding global outliers like in the other density based
clustering methods, this method tries to find anomalous data objects by measuring the local
deviation of a given data object with respect to its neighbors. The local outlier factor is
based on the concept of a local density, where locality is given by k nearest neighbors. To
estimate the density, the distance to those neighbors are taken into account. By comparing
the local density of an object with the local densities of its neighbors, regions of similar
density can be identified. Also, objects that have lower density than their neighbors can be
detected. These are considered to be outliers.
Figure 1: LOF: Object A has a much lower density than its neighbors
Let k-distance(A) be the distance of the object A to the k-th nearest neighbor. We
define reachability distance as
reachability-distancek(A,B) = max{k-distance(B), d(A,B)}
Objects that belong to the k nearest neighbors of B are considered to be equally distant
(see fig. 2).
The local reachability density (ldr) of an object A is defined as the inverse of the average
reachability distance of the object A from its neighbors.
lrd(A) := 1/
(∑
B∈Nk(A) reachability-distancek(A,B)
|Nk(A)|
)
So we define the local outlier factor (LOF) for the object A (taking k neighbors) as
the average local reachability density of the neighbors divided by the object’s own local
reachability density.
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Figure 2: LOF: Objects B and C have the same reachability distance from A, taking k=3.
D is not a k nearest neighbor
LOFk(A) :=
∑
B∈Nk(A)
lrd(B)
lrd(A)
|Nk(A)| =
∑
B∈Nk(A) lrd(B)
|Nk(A)| /lrd(A)
This factor indicates a local density score comparing object A with its neighbors. If the
factor takes the value 1, the object A has the same local density as it’s neighbors. A larger
value indicates that the object A is an outlier. The larger the value, the bigger the outlier.
7. Experiments results
The HPC measuring frequency seems to be important to successfully find valid outliers.
Surprisingly, reading the counters every 1ms or every 10ms don’t increase the detection
capacity, otherwise, the attack detection capacity falls when the measuring frequency is
high. We found that reading HPC events every 100ms improve the efficiency of the LOF
algorithm (and, obviously, makes the process faster and suitable for realtime analysis). We
also found that using 5 neighbors points (k=5) for the LOF algorithm performs well for our
needs.
After the data analysis and comparison, six candidate counters were found: iTLB-load-
misses, dTLB-loads, bus-cycles, LLC-store-misses, LLC-loads, LLC-load-misses.
Figures 3 to 8 show the measures for the candidate events, where the 5 top outliers are
represented by a filled red circle. A vertical red line marks the moment of the attack (or
the program exit if a clean exit was performed). The criterion to select those six counters
as candidates was that outliers counter measures were detected while the attack, and also,
no outlier were detected while the clean exit. In fact, those figures shows how an outlier
measure is detected in the moment of the stack overflow and the ROP attack, but not at
the moment of the clean exit, so it seem that it’s feasible to detect an attack using those
six HPC counters and the LOF algorithm.
As the result shows, the more useful counters for this task are related to cache operations
(except the bus-cycles counter). iTLB refers to the instruction cache while dTLB is about
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Figure 3: HPC cycles
Figure 4: HPC dTLB-loads
Figure 5: HPC iTLB-load-misses
data cache in the translation lookaside buffer (TLB), ie. a cache used when mapping
virtual addresses to physical ones. It makes sense that the iTLB-load-misses counter is a
good predictor because the exploit tries to change the natural program flow.
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Figure 6: HPC LLC-load-misses
Figure 7: HPC LLC-loads
Figure 8: HPC LLC-store-misses
LCC-* counters refers to the last level of the cache hierarchy (the largest but slower cache).
Three of the candidate counters fall in this class of counters, so they proved to be better
predictors of a program exploitation than L1 cache counters.
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Other HPC events like branch-misses seems to be useful, but trend to have a high level of
false positives at the program exit phase.
8. Proposed method for malware detection
Depending on the architecture, only a subset of the proposed HPCs can be used at once. A
value of 2 or 4 may be typical. Let’s n be the number of selected counters and k the number
of neighbors used in the LOF calculation. We define the attack factor for the sequence time
t as
Fattack(t− ((k/2) + 1)) =
∑n
1 LOFk(n)
n
We use the moment t-((k/2)+1)) because we need to evaluate the k neighbors in the
time serie. This factor is the arithmetic mean of the LOF value for the n selected HPCs.
Lets define a threshold value δ > 1. if Fattack(t− ((k/2) + 1)) > δ there is a high provability
of an ongoing attack. A good value for δ is 1.5 or above, but it’s architecture dependent,
so this value should be set by empirical observations. A value k = 5 worked fine in our
experiments, but can be also tuned specifically for different architectures.
9. Conclusions and further work
Previous research works has stated that it’s possible to detect a malware attack using the
HPC measures and Machine Learning. Those works used both supervised and unsupervised
learning. The results demonstrated the feasibility of using HPC for this task, but no suc-
cessful results were achieved without using additional statistical tools to amplify the small
deviations produced by the malware. In this article we have used a different approach based
on the LOF (Local Outlier Factor) density-based clustering method. We found that, with
low false positive rate, it’s possible to detect the attack with no additional statistical tools.
We also found that not all counters are valid in the task of detecting malware. We found
six of them to be valid counters (from those included in our study).
In conclusion, our experiments results shows that an ongoing stack attack can be detected
almost in realtime using HPCs. Anyway, this is a preliminar work on the topic and further
work should be done in order to tune up the proposed technique described in this article.
Specifically
(1) Repeat the experiments with other different software programs (similar result may be
expected).
(2) Repeat the experiments with different type of attacks. In this article we just tested our
method with stack attacks because they are the more common attacks.
(3) Make a real implementation to test the method in real world conditions.
(4) Measure the real impact of false positives.
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